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The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Past
Failures, Present Solutions
Abstract
North Korea has recently announced that it has developed nuclear weapons and
has pulled out of the six-party talks. These events do not emerge out of a vacuum, and
this article lends perspective based on an interdisciplinary lens that seeks to grapple with
the complexities and provide constructive approaches based on this well-researched
understanding. This article analyzes political, military, historical, legal and other angles
of this international crisis.
Past dealings with North Korea have been unfruitful because other nations do not
recognize the ties between North Korean acts and its ideology and objectives. For a
satisfactory resolution to the current crisis, South Korea and the U.S. must maintain
sufficient deterrence, focus on multi-lateral and international avenues, and increase the
negative and later positive incentives for North Korean compliance with its international
obligations.
From an international legal and international organizations perspective, the
multilateral talks can be bolstered by inclusion of the United Nations Secretary General
as a proactive mediator. It can call for, if necessary and after the failure of other means,
UN Security Council action and the reinstitution of the IAEA to do its duly constituted
work of preventing proliferation. If these approaches succeed, the peninsula, region and
world will become better places as a result.
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Introduction

Nuclear physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman turned the hinges of history
through the small but stupendous act of splitting a uranium atom.1 The devastating
power of an atomic bomb itself came about through the efforts of American nuclear
scientists through the Manhattan Project.2 A particular isotope of uranium, U235,
accounts for nuclear possibilities.3 This atom, when hit by a neutron, emits one or more
neutrons along with energy as it breaks apart into two pieces: this process is known as
fission.4 A successive chain reaction can take place under the proper parameters. 5 When
one controls this chain reaction so that the rate of fission remains constant, nuclear
energy results.6
Many nations, including North Korea, make use of nuclear fission to generate
electricity.7 In 1993, contrary to the terms of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty which
it had signed, North Korea refused to allow inspections of one of its nuclear facilities,
which the U.S., Japan, and South Korea suspected of processing nuclear materials for
weapons.8 For the next eighteen months, North Korea played a game of nuclear
brinkmanship—keeping inspectors at arms’ length, threatening to withdraw totally from
the NPT, agreeing to and withdrawing from talks, and increasing the vehemence of its
propaganda to threaten war in the face of proposed sanctions—to try to secure more
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economic aid and political leverage against the U.S.9 B. K. Gills writes that the nuclear
crisis was on a “trajectory towards war” until Jimmy Carter, of his own accord, brokered
a deal that removed the sanction threat if North Korea agreed to inspections, thus averting
the crisis.10
Ten years later, however, not only is North Korea violating its pledge not to
develop nuclear weapons, it has brazenly declared to the world that it already possesses
such weapons.11 Analysts attribute North Korea’s desire for weapons to several factors,
such as deterrence against a perceived Western threat,12 a bargaining chip to gain political
and economic advantages,13 or as a natural extension of the national ideology.14 No
matter the reason, atomic weapons in the hands of a nation with a stated goal to reunite
the Korean Peninsula by force, a nation that has violated all of its major international
agreements, a nation with missile systems capable of reaching South Korea, Japan, and
possibly even the United States, are greatly opposed by these nations.15
This situation is worsened by North Korea’s refusal to engage in multi-nation
talks that include South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, plus North Korea's own traditional

9

Id. at 236-40.
Id. at 240-43; William M. Drennan, Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?, in
THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 159 (Robert J. Art & Patrick M. Cronin, eds., 2003).
11
See, e.g., Michael Duffy, What Does North Korea Want? TIME (Feb. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1027498,00.html; Timeline: N. Korea Nuclear
Dispute, CNN.COM (Feb. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/nkorea.timeline/; North Korea Chronology, available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/nkoreachron_june03.asp (June 2003).
12
See, e.g., Daniel A. Pinkston et al., Special Report on the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Statement,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050211.htm (Feb. 11, 2005).
13
North Korea’s Threat, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Feb. 12, 2005), at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17611-2005Feb11?language=printer.
14
See Sung-Yoon Lee, Global Pressure Point: Nuclear Diplomacy vis-à-vis the DPRK: A Dead-End Street,
27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 151 (Summer/Fall, 2003).
15
See, e.g., Pinkston et al., supra note 12.
10

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

4

allies China and Russia,16 which many analysts view as the best prospect for lasting
solutions.17 Instead, North Korea wants to bypass South Korea, the nation with the most
at stake, and deal with the United States directly.18 Although the U.S. currently opposes
bilateral talks, an effective strategy to address the complexities of the current crisis has
yet to emerge.19
For the past fifty years, North Korea has lied, broken its word, and pushed
tensions to the brink of war, so that negotiations with this country have routinely been
unproductive, if not outright failures. With nuclear weapons in the equation, though, the
need for effective solutions has never been higher. At the same time, one scholar has
called nuclear diplomacy with North Korea “a dead-end street.”20 With these stakes as the
background, this paper presents the history of North Korean relations with other
countries, explores current actions and international responses, and offers solutions, with
a focus on the application of international legal instruments and organizations.

Background: Korea Divided and North Korea as Rogue State
History of the Division
Korean Conflict
After finding itself no longer under the ignominy of the Japanese colonial period
(1905-end of WWII),21 Korea moved into a different sort of problem. The Soviet Union,
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after a period of relative inaction, decided actively to pursue military efforts at the end of
WWII in order to strengthen its hand during post-war settlements.22 They poured south
into Manchuria.23 The resulting U.S.-Soviet agreement, contrary to the will of the
Korean people, split this small peninsula into the U.S.-aligned South Korea and the
Soviet-aligned North Korea, with the Soviets agreeing to push no further south than the
38th parallel.24
Border skirmishes ensued over the next few years until, on the early morning of
June 25th, 1950, North Korean forces embarked on a full-scale war by launching out over
the 38th parallel.25 Premier Kim Il Sung had eight full divisions (135,000 troops) at his
disposal. Many of these soldiers fought previously in World War II.26 By contrast, South
Korea counted only 95,000 generally less-seasoned soldiers.27
The North Korean divisions drove deep into South Korea, overmatching the
smaller South Korean forces, pushed down to the Pusan Perimeter, a relatively small
swath of land at the southernmost tip of the peninsula.28 The North Korean troops made
full use of the advantage of surprise and initiative.29
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As the North steamrolled the South, the U.S. called upon the UN Security Council
to take action against North Korean aggression.30 The Security Council, with the support
of fifty-three U.N. member states, called upon its members to send military assistance:
twenty-nine member states made specific offers to help.31 As it turned out, twenty
countries came to the aid of South Korea. General Douglas MacArthur stepped forward
as the United Nations commander of the combined forces.32
MacArthur lead a key counter-initiative known as the Inchon Landing, a tricky
military maneuver due to the tides.33 By the middle of September, 1950, MacArthur's
forces not only plowed back to the 38th parallel, they continued on north.34 As the U.N.
forces proceeded closer to the North Korean-Chinese border, Chinese soldiers poured
into North Korea, driving the U.N. forces back.35 After two more pushes, one northward
by the U.N. troops and one southward by the Chinese, the battle lines hardened for two
more years back where they started—the 38th parallel.36
Armistice Agreement
With a military draw by mid-1951, the two sides negotiated from that point for
two years, resulting in the Korean Armistice Agreement ("Armistice Agreement"), signed
on July 27th, 1953.37 The head of the North Korean military and the Commander-inChief of the U.N. Command signed this Armistice Agreement.38
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While this Agreement calls for a cease-fire, it is not a peace treaty.39 This
Armistice Agreement established the military line of demarcation, and the demilitarized
zone (DMZ).40 The Military Armistice Commission oversees this Agreement.41
The Armistice Agreement, intended as a temporary measure by its own terms,
was supposed to be replaced by a peace treaty through a conference convening within
three months after the Armistice Agreement.42 While a treaty emerging from the
conference was supposed to settle the remaining issues such as withdrawal of foreign
forces from Korea and a new peace for the Land of the Morning Calm, this anticipated
peace treaty did not come about as planned. Due to this gap, the two Koreas signed the
Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between
North and South towards the end of 1991, and the Joint Declaration in 1992.43
North Korea as Rogue State44
History of Hostile Actions
Notwithstanding the Armistice, the U.S. Congressional Research Service has
documented some 124 provocations by North Korea against the U.S., South Korea,
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and/or Japan from June 1950 to March 2003.45 They have ranged from multiple
assassination attempts on South Korean Presidents,46 to the infiltration of thousands of
armed agents involved in kidnapping and terrorism,47 the mid-air bombing of a South
Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in 198748 to the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo, a
surveillance ship.49
There have been various air and naval encounters over the years. In April 1969,
North Korea MiG jet fighters destroyed a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane over the Sea
or Japan, taking 31 lives.50 This unarmed plane was flying around 90 miles off the North
Korean coast.51 As recently as March 2003, four North Korean fighters intercepted an
American Air Force reconnaissance plane in international airspace above the Sea of
Japan.52 The North Korean Navy has captured and detained numerous South Korean
merchant ships that have entered its territorial sea.53
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Military Sales
North Korea has aggressively exported ballistic missile technology over several
decades.54 North Korea has sold this technology to countries such as Libya,55 Pakistan,
Syria, Egypt, Iran and the United Arab Emirates,56 grossing hundreds of millions of
dollars per year, its largest source of hard currency.57 North Korea's financial stake in the
development and sale of missile technology drives its economy.58
In October of 2002, North Korea reportedly assisted Pakistan in developing longrange missiles. This activity falls in line with the intermediate range ballistic missiles
supplied to Pakistan in the 1990's.59 In the late 1990's, it is thought that North Korea
furnished Pakistan with twelve to twenty-five complete No-Dong medium range missiles.
Ominously, North Korea gained from Pakistan centrifuge enrichment technology, which
it can use (and may have already used) for producing nuclear weapons.60
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Such proliferation efforts have continued. For example, a North Korean vessel
transported Scud missiles to Yemen in December of 2002.61 A spokesman for the
Nigerian government indicated that a North Korean delegation showed the Nigerian
government a catalogue of weapons—but that Nigeria had not made a definite
commitment to purchase them yet.62
Biological and Chemical Weapons in North Korea
North Korea joined the Biological Weapons Convention, an international treaty
that for the most part does not permit even possession of biological weapons.63 However,
it appears that North Korea has developed biological weapons such as anthrax, yellow
fever, smallpox, cholera, and plague.64
Unlike the Biological Weapons Convention, North Korea did not sign the
Chemical Weapons Convention.65 Consistent with their refusal to sign, North Korea has
a formidable assemblage of such weapons.66 North Korean military doctrine asserts the
use of chemical weapons as standard weaponry, which makes the use of chemical
61
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weapons in a fashion akin to conventional weapons a looming concern.67 The choice not
to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention involved conflict within the regime and
illustrates the dominance of military considerations in this country.68

The Present Situation with North Korea
Projections Regarding Another Korean War
Military planners project that in the event of a North Korean full-scale invasion,
the first several months of conflict could see some 300,000 to half a million casualties in
the South Korean and U.S. militaries, as well as additional hundreds of thousands of
civilian casualties.69 According to Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute, total casualties for
such a war could exceed 1,000,000.70 Oplan 5027, the U.S. military's plan for the region,
anticipates massive attacks on Seoul with artillery and rockets, possibly turning Seoul
into a "sea of fire" through launching up to half a million shells per hour.71 A preemptive strike by North Korea could inflict huge levels of casualties and damage before
the South Korean and U.S. military could do much to block such attacks72 or preemptively defang the North Korean military by military force.73 While analysts typically
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project an eventual South Korean/American victory, this victory would come at great
price: some might call it a Pyhrric victory.74
There exists a more devious possibility that North Korea has hinted at by its firing
of missiles over Japan, kidnapping of Japanese citizens, and other hostile actions: North
Korea could attack U.S. bases in Japan.75 In this scenario, North Korea would seek to
fray or split the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, and possibly move towards
uniting the two Koreas. Given the rising anti-U.S. sentiment, especially among the
younger generations of South Koreans, the tilt in the South Korean government towards
socialism, the friendly overtures of South Korea (both governmental and private) to
North Korea, the prevalent pro-North Korean and anti-American media bias, North
Korean infiltrations in South Korea, and the strong desire of the Korean populace to
unite, such a scheme takes on increased credibility.76
Regardless of whether or not North Korea attacks U.S. military bases in Japan, it
can still attack, or threaten to attack, Japanese targets. In one conceivable scenario, North
Korea can blitzkrieg the South, and then threaten to destroy major Japanese cities if the
U.S. sends reinforcements. North Korea seeks to weaken America's will to defend South
Korea, foment favorable political conditions in South Korea, and then wage war to
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distract their own populace from their extensive woes.77 Official North Korean policy
maintains the objective of re-unifying Korea by force: they consider a violent Communist
revolution of the South to be their manifest destiny.78
South Korea, for many reasons including economic, political, historical and
humanitarian, has strong incentives to avoid the outbreak of another war on the Korean
peninsula.79 In one form or another, war does not present itself as an attractive option.
Resources
North Korean Military
The North Korean situation requires a delicate balance: at one extreme, the risk of
war which would prove disastrous for the entire peninsula, and at the other extreme, the
risk of blackmail and exploitation--where North Korea would receive the benefits that it
would divert for its own devious ends. It is advisable to explore both extremes in order to
find the parameters for the best solutions. This section of the article focuses on the
extreme of potential war.
The devastating capabilities North Korea possesses must be kept in mind. In
conventional weapons alone, it is one of the leading countries in the world in total
number of military units. While it may be accurately stated that some of these units are
not the most state of the art weapons available, the sheer overwhelming numbers
nonetheless make North Korea a menacing foe indeed. North Korea has many artillery,
mortars, rockets, and missiles pointed and ready to turn the city of Seoul80 into rubble.
North Korea boasts the ability to field approximately five to seven million troops; it
77
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already has about 1,000,000 soldiers in its standing forces, 120,000 special operation
forces, 11,000 forward deployed artillery pieces, 1,700 aircraft, 800 ships, 500 170millimeter guns, 200 multiple- launch rocket systems, 62 submarines, cave and
underground bases, air defense weapons, mobile missile launchers and other potential
causes of military mayhem.81
One of the questions that remain is what sort of missile delivery technology does
North Korea possess and is that technology sufficient to deliver a nuclear warhead to the
United Stated of America? It is safe to say presently that North Korea has the missile
delivery technology to strike South Korea and Japan, and, if they so foolishly desired, to
strike various parts of China as well.82 The huge population densities of both South
Korea and Japan would make such weapons, especially nuclear weapons, particularly
destructive as they would take more lives per square mile than other locales—due to the
greater number of people per unit of area.
While the might of the U.S. military would likely be able to eventually win or at
least maintain or return to the status quo in a fight against North Korea alone, it would do
so at great cost. The cost of human lives and property on the Korean peninsula would
likely dwarf the casualties suffered during the first Korean War.83
Additionally and more alarming is the possibility for another Korean war to draw
in China.84 After all, during the Korean War, it was the Chinese forces that turned back
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the U.N. forces as they were approaching the Yalu River near the Chinese border. China
would want to maintain North Korea as a buffer between it and South Korea, both
geographically and ideologically.85
The U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula
Nuclear: The U.S. nuclear presence in Korea has steadily dwindled to none. In
1967, the U.S. had over 800 nuclear weapons south of the DMZ.86 That number
decreased to around 600 by 1977, 151 by 1985,87 and in 1991, the U.S. removed all of its
nuclear weapons from Korea.88 However, because the U.S. has long-range delivery
systems, the presence of nuclear weapons in Korea—or even Asia—carries less
significance than if the U.S. had only mid-range or short-range delivery abilities.89
Conventional: The Army has 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea. These
troops have ample equipment, such as Apache helicopters and Patriot missile batteries.90
The largest forward-deployed fleet of the Navy, the 7th Fleet, rests not far from the
shores of North Korea.91 Around 200 aircraft, forty to fifty ships,92 and some 20,000
Navy and Marine personnel constitute the 7th Fleet.93 Air Force deployment in the
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Pacific numbers 45,000 military and civilian personnel—with about 300 fighter and
attack aircraft under its control.94 The Seventh Air Force perches in Korea with the Fifth
in Japan.95
These forces in the Pacific, some in and around Korea and Japan, can respond
rapidly to an outbreak of hostilities. At the same time, the ability to quickly deploy
additional military resources enables rapid reinforcement of the present numbers.
South Korean Resources
Military: With mandatory military service for male citizens, South Korea can
mobilize approximately 4,500,000 well-equipped soldiers with newer armaments than
their North Korean counterparts, such as over 3000 tanks and 1500 strike aircraft.96
Approximately 5,300 mortars and two surface-to-surface battalions add to the South
Korean military resources.97
Economic: The robust South Korean economy, once the second to poorest at the
end of the Korean War, now stands as the 12th largest economy in the world, with a per
capita GNP of U.S. $10,000.98 It would have large capabilities to sustain a war effort, if
those capabilities would not already find themselves devastated by a North Korean
attack. However, after another war with North Korea, the South Korean economy might

94

Pacific Air Forces, at http://www.osan.af.mil/Facts/Pacific%20Air%20Forces.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2004).
95
U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, at
http://www.usa.or.th/services/docs/reports/ussec1.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). The Seventh Air Force
includes the Fifty-first and Eighth Fighter Wings, with a combined 117 planes and 8,300 air force
personnel. The Fifty-first uses A-10 aircraft as well as three squadrons of F-16 fighter aircraft. See also
7th Air Force, at http://www.osan.af.mil/Facts/7th%20Air%20Force.htm (last modified Apr. 2003).
96
Kozaryn, supra note 74.
97
Orders of Battle and Major Equipment: South Korean and North Korea, at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/orbat-comp.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
98
Background Note: South Korea, Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.ntm (Mar. 2003).

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

17

end up flattened even more than after the first Korean War99 because there exists more to
destroy—whether infrastructure, industry, edifices or people.
Kim Jong-Il
On the other extreme from full-out warfare are the problems that result from
deceit and blackmail in the political arena. In the case of North Korea, politics flows
from the top, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il. Early intelligence wrongfully assessed
Kim Jong-Il as unintelligent. Later intelligence corrected this earlier assessment, and
concluded instead that Kim possesses a high-powered intellect. Estimates of his I.Q.
have placed it at around 160.
Kim Il Sung groomed his son Kim Jong Il to take the reins of power from him
starting from the early 1970s.100 As Korean Workers Party Secretary, he ran the
organization, including its propaganda function.101 In 1980, the Sixth Party Congress
named him the official successor.102
In 1991, Kim Jong Il ascended to the position of Supreme Commander of the
People's Army and Chairman of the National Defense Committee in 1993.103 Throughout
this time, propaganda deifying Kim Jong Il drummed its way into the day-to-day life of
North Korea.104
According to defectors from North Korea itself, the North Korean populace, in
spite of the propaganda, knows about Kim Jong Il's immoral behavior, the failure of his
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economic policies, and the politicized nature of his inner circle.105 The deterioration of
the country on many fronts would tend to diminish the glorified image of this totalitarian
dictator.106
The Present Crisis
History of the Geneva Protocol
The 1994 Agreed Framework107 resulted from intensive negotiations, and marked
a departure from the otherwise relatively uniform policy of the Clinton administration to
what it termed "rogue states". The policy towards North Korea, dubbed "limited
engagement by necessity", emerged out of heated discussion and debate, both within the
Clinton administration and also with the Republican-led Congress.108
During this debate, the range of options considered included pre-emptive strikes
of the known nuclear facilities, proposed sanctions, and a negotiated agreement with
North Korea.109 Even a focused pre-emptive attack solely on the nuclear facilities carried
with it, even according to the military leaders at the time, too much risk of a full-blown
war.110 The Clinton administration actually started pursuing the sanctions option when a
visit to Pyongyang by former president Jimmy Carter derailed such efforts.111
With the reluctant permission of President Clinton (permission that president
George H.W. Bush had previously refused to give), Jimmy Carter went on a peacemaking
mission to Pyongyang.112 Upon Carter's return, he pronounced the end of the crisis
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through getting Kim Il Sung's agreement to freeze North Korea's nuclear program under
IAEA inspections, and to come back to the bargaining table with the then current U.S.
administration.113
This trip served as a catalyst for the negotiations that led to the Geneva Protocol,
also known as the Agreed Framework.114 The planned initial meeting between the DPRK
and the US in Geneva found itself suspended due to the demise of Kim Il Sung, the selfstyled "Great Leader" who had ruled North Korea from its inception until July 9th, 1994.
After a one-month delay, the negotiation resumed. A joint statement emerged on
August 12th, which announced the core of the agreement. Ambassador Gallucci and
First Vice Foreign Minister concluded it on October 17th, and signed it on October 21st.
The four-page document was a carefully crafted agreement implementing the
DPRK’s transition from graphite-moderated nuclear reactors to light water reactors.115
This transition was scheduled to take place over a decade, buttressed by substantial
commitments from the US to replace lost generating capacity through shipments of heavy
oil.116 The agreement met resistance from some quarters as a "sellout and an act of
appeasement."117 Others hailed it as a major achievement for peace on the peninsula.118
Breach of the Agreement and the Current Situation
As events have unfolded afterwards, it has become obvious that North Korea has
materially breached the Agreed Framework. In 1998, U.S. intelligence discovered a large
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underground facility that could support nuclear weapon development.119 In a meeting
with Ambassador Kelly, a North Korean official disclosed North Korea's present
possession of nuclear weaponry, a statement later denied by Pyongyang.120 During this
very year (2005), North Korea publicly announced that it had already developed nuclear
weapons.
Given the breach of contract, KEDO suspended shipment of heavy oil and
scrapped the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project. North Korea claimed U.S. breach of
the agreement and stated that it must develop and produce nuclear weapons as a deterrent
against potential American aggression, which they claim to genuinely fear.121 North
Korea then withdrew from the ongoing six party talks—formerly involving itself, South
Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. The Bush administration has refused to
engage in bilateral negotiations thus far with Pyongyang in an effort to avoid what it sees
as blackmail.
Various Responses to North Korea
North Korea’s behavior regarding nuclear weapons has led many American
sources, ranging from scholars and politicians to comedians and talk show hosts, to
suggest that North Korea acts and speaks in a crazy and irrational manner.122 While it
may be correct to speak about North Korea in this fashion if one incorporates a moral
dimension to those statements, it is inaccurate in terms of whether or not North Korea’s
behavior and speech is logically connected with their own goals and objectives.
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North Korea has a goal of holding on to power, of removing American
involvement in the peninsula, of reunifying Korea by force, and of wresting benefits from
other countries through the use of threats and coercion due to the deteriorated condition
of their own country. Understanding these goals will help one to make sense of North
Korea’s actions—as insidious as many of these resulting activities have been. Though
dangerous and seemingly desperate, the actions of North Korea are not irrational or
illogical. Perhaps the single biggest mistake by the United States and South Korea in past
dealings with North Korea has been to ignore or misinterpret this logic. This section
analyzes past dealings in four major areas—military, political, economic, and ethnic—to
show that past responses to North Korea have been inadequate or wrong-headed. Then, it
recommends better solutions for dealing in each of these four areas. The article then
concludes by focusing on potential solutions relating to international legal theory.
Military
Background
As the preceding sections make clear, North Korea’s most obvious—and, for the
world, dangerous—goals are militaristic: holding on to power in its totalitarian
dictatorship, reunifying Korea by force, and extracting benefits from other countries
through the use of threats and coercion.123 It should be no surprise that North Korea has
continued with its belligerent and hostile actions towards the United States and South
Korea repeatedly since the cease-fire--whether a naval battle with South Korea, frequent
border skirmishes, or intentional incursions into South Korea of thousands of armed
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agents.124 These actions have extended to Japan as well.125 Time after time, North Korea
has persistently sought these aforementioned objectives, often in overtly hostile ways.
Past Military Responses
As the sections above make clear, the response of key countries such as South
Korea, the United States, and Japan have been to reduce their military force relative to
North Korea. Because North Korea’s goal is to unify Korea, by force if necessary, then
such a response moves in the wrong direction. For example, one devious way in which
North Korea may seek to start a war is by having their own soldiers dressed in South
Korean military uniforms pretending like they are invading North Korea, and in response
to this phony incursion, North Korea attacking South Korea with the justification of
having been "attacked" first. They have actually had military exercises where they are
practicing such a subterfuge.
Recommended Military Solutions
A better solution would be for these nations to increase the defensive capabilities
of their military. The South Korean military should ready itself because the belligerent
rhetoric of North Korea has sometimes spilled into combat, and a very important thing
that South Korea needs to do is have enough of a deterrent--especially in terms of
defensive measures--readily at hand.126 Such measures should discourage the outbreak of
war, and send a clear message to North Korea that they would meet vigorous resistance
and ultimately find defeat if they instigate another war.
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Another option is for Japan to indicate it will bolster its military in order to defend
against the North Korean threat, which perhaps could motivate China to persuade North
Korea to disarm.127 In recent years Japan has taken a harder line toward North Korea, but
so far has increased only its defensive and not offensive capabilities.128 If it looks like the
US is behind that effort though (as in the efforts of U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos), then perhaps
it would not achieve the desired effect.
Finally, the US should at least send greater defensive reinforcements, such as
more Patriot missile batteries.129 The emphasis on defense forecloses reasonable pretexts
for North Korea to attack pre-emptively by considering buildup of offensive capabilities
as an indicator of imminent U.S. attack. North Korea might try to claim that America is
building up its military forces in and around the peninsula in order to attack North Korea:
Pyongyang could, for example, draw analogies with of the military buildup in Iraq prior
to that war.130 However, primarily defensive reinforcements would at once take away
such an excuse while preparing for a possible attack by North Korea.
Political
Background
The North Korean pattern of brinkmanship or "negotiating on the edge"—as Scott
Snyder has put it in his book by that title, and as shown in a recent book on North Korean
negotiation strategy—is in fivesteps: 1) escalate the crisis; 2) use it to gain bargaining
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leverage, to get the desired parties (most particularly the U.S.) to the table, such as the
Clinton administration for bi-lateral negotiations; 3) as a result of the crisis, to come to an
agreement which 4) gives them benefits, which they swallow; and then 5) not abide by
their promises, break the agreement, and create another crisis—thus starting this cycle
again.131
What must also be recognized is that deception and breaking of their word has
been the norm, not the exception, for North Korea. In addition to North Korea's deception
of the international community, it extends as well to the steady stream of lies that it
pumps to its populace. Its propaganda states ridiculous things: that South Korea is in
much worse economic condition than North Korea; the outlandish deification of the
dictator Kim Jong Il; the ever present threat of attack from South Korea and the United
States; and the false promises that a communist utopia will come about if the populace
just perseveres a little bit longer.132 Also, North Korea levels a steady stream of wild
accusations against South Korea and the US that probably would better describe what
North Korea has done and where it stands rather than what either South Korea or the US
has done against North Korea.133
One recurring problem involves North Korean efforts to negotiate directly with
the U.S. while sidelining South Korea. Given the continuing North Korean policy that
131
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fails to officially recognize or engage in official diplomacy with South Korea,134 and
continues on the path of seeking forceful reunification, there exist continuing tensions
about how to conduct multilateral negotiations.135
Responses to North Korean Deceit and Brinkmanship
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice recently responded to North Korean
accusations that the US is hostile to North Korea and is about to wage war and attack
North Korea. Secretary Rice called such rhetoric ridiculous--that there exist no war plans
against North Korea presently. These recent accusations amount to nothing more than
the continued spewing of the North Korean propaganda machine, the lineup of lies that it
regularly puts forth to its populace.136
Although these actions by Rice indicate an awareness of North Korean tactics,
other parts of our government do not seem to appreciate fully how North Korea operates.
Pronouncements by Representative Curt Weldon, who was part of a recent Congressional
delegation to North Korea, appear overly optimistic. Shortly after their return, he claimed
that North Korea anticipated de-nuclearizing.137 Not long after that press conference, in a
matter of weeks, North Korea announced unabashedly to the world that it possessed
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nuclear weapons.138 The ranking democratic foreign relations committee member (Tom
Lantos) drew a parallel in a speech at John Hopkins’ School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS) the example of Libya reaping economic and political benefits from
voluntarily disarming their arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.139 Such a prospect
does not reflect North Korea's past patterns of behavior.140
Recommended Political Solutions
While Representative Lantos acknowledged that it is a "longshot" that North
Korea would go the path of Libya, his words nonetheless indicate members of the U.S.
Congress want to take a softer approach than the Bush administration.141 The present
administration’s insistence on six party talks over bilateral negotiations directly with
North Korea helps to counter North Korea’s attempt to go over the head of South Korea-and for that matter over the heads of its regional neighbors--to directly negotiate with the
US.142 Such bilateral talks, which led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, not only failed, but
also gave additional time for North Korea to become more dangerous and to reap benefits
without meeting its obligations. The present administration’s approach, whatever its
overall merits, at least avoids such blackmail.
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Lantos did parlay a tactic might help the U.S. politically, although it may have
helped even more if the speaker came from elsewhere than the U.S.: he had spoken to
leaders in China and indicated how it was in China’s interest to see that North Korea got
rid of its weapons of mass destruction because of the possibility of Japan’s re-arming to
defend and deter North Korean potential aggression with such weapons.143 Given the
history of hostilities that historically had transpired between China and Japan, China
would not want Japan to rearm. Thus, Lantos used the approach that former secretary of
state George Schultz had suggested would be an effective way to motivate China to step
in to help disarm North Korea.144
Economic
Background
If North Korea merely diminished its military spending by approximately five to
ten percent, then it could potentially feed its starving populace; yet, it refuses to do so. It
has preferred artillery, tanks, and fighter planes to rice, kimchi (Korean pickled
vegetables), and kalbi (Korean style marinated short ribs)--thus deciding to be armed to
the teeth while turning their populace into ragged skeletons.
The Korea Institute for National Unification (“KINU”) published an interesting
empirical study that takes the factors used by Zbigniew Brezizinski, formally prominent
in the Carter administration and now a scholar in the field of international relations,
where he examined various different factors to measure the degree of crisis within
regimes in Eastern Europe to help to predict whether they would be experiencing
143
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impending collapse, transformation, regime change, and other similar events.145 KINU
took the Breszinski factors, added some of their own that were appropriate to the North
Korean context, and measured to what extent the North Korean regime is in crisis and the
probability that it would implode. Their conclusion, after analysis of political, social,
economic, cultural, and other factors, was that even through 1995—when their
measurements ended—North Korea had already entered a crisis level.146 Many of those
factors were on a downward trend, meaning that they were degenerating, potentially
leading to regime transformation or regime change if these trends were not reversed.147
Incentives, Trade, and Humanitarian Aid in Response
Ten years later, if one presumes that at least the majority of those factors have
grown worse, then North Korea has grown closer and closer to imploding from within.
The initial implementation of economic free-enterprise zones may have helped to start to
reverse their economic woes, but more likely, a greater factor in helping sustain North
Korea, as was mentioned earlier, is increased trade and aid, most particularly from South
Korea. From 1985 to 1996, there was 1.2 billion dollars worth of trade from South Korea
to North Korea. Predominantly, the amount flowing from North Korea to South Korea
was miniscule, but the numbers have been increasing since that time.148
The head of Hyundai, one of the two giant conglomerates in Korea, has been
funding various projects, including the Mount Guhmgahng tourism, as well as an entire
industrial zone, various donations and provision of funds for infrastructure.149 That type

145

Sung Chull Kim et al., supra note 68, at 124.
Id. at 124.
147
Id. at 126.
148
In a historic move, North Korea actually shipped shirts to South Korea in 2005.
149
Young Whan Kihl, The DPRK and its Relations with the ROK, in KOREA BRIEFING 1997-1999 139
(Kongdan Oh, ed., 2000).
146

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

29

of aid from various South Korean sources has been increasing, and increasing
dramatically. China is another major source of aid and trade, but Russia has diminished
its aid to North Korea due to its own economic woes.150 What must be realized is that
North Korea only engages the international community to the extent that it thinks it can
benefit from such interaction while continuing to pursue its own inimical goals. While
North Korea may have established diplomatic relationships with 140 countries, the depth
of the relationships extend no further than the instrumental pursuit of its own interests at
best.
North Korea claims that if it just gets sufficient humanitarian aid, then it would be
sustained thereby. The root problem is more foundational, though: its economic system
has failed.151 North Korea is, however, experimenting with economic free enterprise
zones, which seem to be a step in the right direction as far as increasing production. They
have remained, however, unwilling to cut military spending, which would free the
necessary resources to be able to feed their country. The means to be able to help their
citizens, and the people inside North Korea, is within their own grasp, but rather than
increasing overall production, they even cut food rations to a portion of their populace
during the latter part of the 1990's.
Obviously, to help open up the society and the economy, North Korea should
implement reforms that move towards a more free-market, capitalistic system that
rewards industriousness, productivity and enterprise. It has made slight steps in that
direction as mentioned, and trade, especially with South Korea, has increased
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dramatically—even as it has evaporated with almost the entire rest of the world. But
North Korean so- called “trade” is more charity than anything else, where South Korea is
helping North Korea, and getting little to nothing in return, except the continued
animosity and hostility of the Pyongyang regime.152
Representative Lantos indicated that sanctions against North Korea already exist.
One scholar suggests that U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea have not worked
to force North Korea to change. However, these sanctions provide a bargaining chip that
allows the U.S. to maintain a policy of containment and appeasement that at least keeps
the crisis on the Korean peninsula from worsening.153
A More Hands-Off Solution to Economic Development
To promote change, however, a better approach would be at the very least,
continued containment and deterrance, where nations such as Japan and the U.S.—and
especially South Korea—take the path of patiently waiting, and perhaps in some ways
accelerating, an internal implosion--the demise of North Korea from within. This would
require nothing more than ceasing, or at least dramatically reducing, trade and
humanitarian aid so that North Korea would be forced to negotiate more broadly—and
more honestly.154 Current trade and humanitarian efforts are undoubtedly paved with
good intentions and compassion. However, they also help to reinforce a terrible regime,
one that has miserably failed its people, so that such aid may be delaying the internal
152

The large cost of reconstructing north Korea’s collapsed economic infrastructure “will have to be
carried, in effect, on the balance sheets of South Korea’s government, South Korea’s corporations, and,
ultimately, South Korea’s households.” Bosworth, supra note 130, at 28.
153
Paul VanWagenen, Note, U.S. Economic Sanctions—Non-Traditional Success against North Korea, 32
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 239 (2000); see also Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1491 (May, 2003) (arguing that sanctions phasedown and increased food aid would
improve U.S.-North Korean talks).
154
International organizations and other nations provide North Korea with hundreds of thousands of tons of
food aid, and South Korea provides over 35 percent of the humanitarian assistance. Yang, supra note 151,
at 32.

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

31

collapse of North Korea. The one drawback is that North Korea may respond to
economic reductions with military force; thus, South Korea and her allies must maintain a
substantial military deterrent as outlined above.
One can argue that even if North Korea will collapse, it is better for them to
collapse with better economic conditions in order to alleviate the burden of South Korea,
as well as other nations and organizations that would help. However, it seems that given
the determination of Kim Jong Il and his regime to hold on to power at all costs, and to
orient the whole regime to maintaining a grip on power rather than serving the common
good of the populace that exists there, it is highly likely that aid to North Korea would
only tend to increase the grip that Kim Jong Il and his cronies have on this country,
especially given the diversion of aid to government and military personnel rather than the
peasants who need it most.155
Ethnic and Nationalistic Propaganda
Background
Hwang Jang Yop156 indicated that North Korea is seeking to foment favorable
political conditions within South Korea. These efforts seem to be working on various
different fronts. For example, the current and immediate past president, as well as many
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members of the South Korean legislature, have socialist tendencies, which is moving in
the direction towards the failed communism that has been happening in North Korea.
From the government, there increasingly have been elements that have been favorable
towards North Korea and its system—which is strange, given the domestic disaster that is
North Korea, and the relative paradise by comparison that South Korea has become.
Additionally, according to the Seoul bureau chief of Time Magazine,157 the South
Korean media is reluctant to report North Korean abuse and aggression, whether to Japan
or to South Korea itself, but it is quick to trumpet stories that magnify any real or
perceived transgression of a soldier or any one else from the US. There has emerged a
naiveté combined with wishful thinking about the intentions of North Korea, and a willful
disbelief of the bellicose intentions of North Korea on the part of a good number of South
Korean youth, who never experienced the Korean War. The Time Magazine bureau chief
said when he visited the law school at which I served as a founding professor that the
South Korean media tends to downplay or even ignore a lot of North Korean acts of
aggression, whether it be sending submarines down to South Korea where spies emerge
and infiltrate, or naval skirmishes between North and South Korea near the borderline, or
North Korea’s wrongful actions against Japan, such as the kidnapping of innocent
Japanese civilians conscripted into teaching North Korea officials Japanese. These stories
receive relatively low or little press, whereas anything that seems even remotely like a
U.S. soldier doing wrong, the headlines magnify disproportionately. 158 Such reporting
tends to drive a wedge between South Korea and the US. North Korea actively has
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sought to take advantage of, and deepen, any rifts or disagreements between these allies,
as well as with other involved countries (such as Japan, Russia and China).
In addition, South Korean media and other sources, such as books, have tended to
demonize the US while indicating attractive points of North Korea. These sources have
helped to inculcate in the younger generations a sizable degree of anti-Americanism as
well as pro-North Korean sentiments.159 North Korea regularly seeks to implant antiAmerican and pro-North Korean propaganda in South Korea, and it seems that they have
done so successfully to a large extent. As an example, North Korea likes to say that it has
to liberate South Korea from US imperialism and domination, and thus, damages the
pride of South Korea by in essence speaking of South Korea as if it were a colony under
the thumb of the US.160
Recently, a professor at Seoul National University (considered the leading
university in South Korea) who had taught sociology in Seoul National University for
over 30 years was recently discovered to be a North Korean spy when two fellow spies
were linked to him. These spies confessed that this professor emeritus had been a North
Korean spy all along. North Korea has thus been able to infiltrate influential centers of
South Korean culture, and the culture, sadly enough, seems to be swallowing more of the
North Korean propaganda161 —and other reinforcing messages. Ironically enough, such
devious communication exists in South Korea because as a developing democracy, it
allows incomparably more freedom of speech than North Korea.
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There are also appeals to Korean nationalism, such that the common bond of
Korean ethnicity is touted as being more important than other pieces of common ground,
such as the extensive common ground that the US and South Korea share, both in terms
of their inner relationship, but also the common ground in terms of their systems. North
Korea is an entirely different sort of society economically, politically, religiously,
socially--in all these ways. There exists much more common ground, and much more of
a relationship between South Korea and the US, than between South Korea and North
Korea.162 The South Korean media, a significant portion of university students, and now
many government elements in South Korea are sympathetic with the North Korean
regime, sees the U.S. as a big bully against North Korea and an exploiter of South Korea,
and sees North Korea as one of us, "our people," as fellow ethnic Koreans. For many
especially in the generations in South who did not experience the Korea War, it is
possible that affinities with the U.S. politically, socially, economically, and legally can be
overshadowed by the common ethnic blood that is shared between North and South
Korea.
Playing into this misguided identity politics is the strong nationalism of Koreans
as Koreans (not North and South Koreans) and a strong sense of ethnic identity that has
not only survived many invasions, many attacks, and many attempts to dominate or even
colonize it, but has grown stronger in resistance against outside attacks. That being the
case, they are susceptible to this sort of propaganda and rhetoric. There are many in
Korea, especially among the younger generations and the media, who want the U.S. out.
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Indeed, that plays into the hands of North Korea propaganda, which says South Korea is
not free, must be liberated by North Korea, because South Korea is under the imperialist
fist of the US. This way of thinking and feeling plays right into the hands of North
Korea, and if it was not for the deterrent of American military might, South Korea might
already be overrun by North Korea, and there would be a unified Korea, but it would be
under Kim Jong Il and the totalitarian dictatorship thereof.
The North Korean regime puts the entire society in a straitjacket. It has at least ten
known concentration camps, where political dissidents are tortured and executed, and a
regime that has had many people literally starve to death or suffer greatly from
malnutrition and starvation. There is no ability to socialize freely, no freedom of
association, no freedom of press, no freedom of expression, no freedom of speech, no
freedom of religion. The rights, freedoms and privileges that Americans and even South
Koreas can at times take for granted are non-existent in North Korea. Since there is no
freedom of movement either, a North Korean citizen cannot travel freely out of the
country. It is an iron cage of a society with the canary inside wasting away--and certainly
not singing.
Responses, or a Lack Thereof
Deep, historic ties exist between South Korea and the U.S., given that South
Korea and the US have been close allies over the past half-century. In fact, the
development of the two Koreas is intimately linked to the influence of other nations. Just
as North Korea is an exaggerated version of Maoist China and Stalinist Soviet Union,
through U.S. protection and investment, South Korea has developed into a much more
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free-enterprise, democratic, and open society than its Northern counterpart.163 So there
are extensive social, economic, political, religious, educational, and cultural ties.
These ties ought not be taken for granted or subsumed under the anti-U.S. rhetoric
barrage tilting the culture. A solution would be for those in power in South Korea, and
those in the media sympathetic to U.S.-South Korean ties, to promote the affinities
between the two nations. South Korea must learn that all it has received back from North
Korea for its extensive aid and economic investments has been continued hostility and an
unrelenting aggressive stance against it. South Koreans need to know that they may be
helping to sustain a failed regime, stoking the dying embers of that society, whereas if
South Korea were not subsidizing North Korea to the extent that has, perhaps it would
have collapsed already. South Korea may be unwittingly delaying the peaceful
unification of the Korean peninsula by virtue of their propping up of a malignant,
totalitarian dictatorship.
Legal and Diplomatic Solutions to North Korea
Although the above sections point to facets of an overall approach to dealing with
North Korea, this essay climaxes with international legal and international relations
applications, which would do well to consider the above context.
Multi-Party, Not Bilateral, Negotiations
The Problem with Bilateral
China and Russia, among others, have urged appeasement of North Korea’s
repeated demands for a bi-lateral security agreement with the United States.164 That
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would be inadvisable. Hwang Jang Yop, the highest level defector from North Korea,
indicated that North Korea still is intent on taking over South Korea and the whole
peninsula (unification by force is the official North Korean policy still), and in order to
do so, it seeks to take the U.S. out of the picture.165 The U.S. commitment to defend
South Korea is the principal impediment for North Korea not to take over the
peninsula166—after all, it was the U.S. forces, along with the UN and South Korean
forces, which pushed back North Korean aggression during the Korean War. Thus, it
would be a mistake to take Pyongyang’s insistence upon the security agreement with the
U.S. as simply the paranoid delusions of a regime that anticipates U.S. aggression to
dismantle the regime. Rather, if Hwang Jang Yop’s diagnosis is correct, and he has the
best and highest inside view of the regime available, it is a very calculated effort for the
North Koreans to take the U.S. out of the picture as far as defending South Korea on the
peninsula.167
A recent U.S. bipartisan congressional delegation claimed some success in
speaking with the North Korean government.168 Apparently, in an attempt to defuse the
North Korean nuclear deterrent reasoning for its nuclear weapons program, the U.S.
delegation indicated that Washington did not seek regime change nor plan a pre-emptive
attack.169 During this visit, the beleaguered North reportedly offered to become a
"friend" of the United States if Washington did not make inflammatory remarks about
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Kim Jong Il's regime.170 The North Korean government also stated its desire to resume
"substantive discussions" according to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) with no option "off the
table," including an end result of "giving up their nuclear capability."171
Based on its repeated history of mendaciousness, obsessive efforts to keep a grip
on its power, past reaping of benefits without corresponding adherence to the obligations
that it agrees to, and continued goal to remove the U.S. from the picture on the peninsula,
one should view this recent claim with the benefit of past experience and a knowledge of
North Korea’s ambitions. Even the day after this meeting, the official, governmentcontrolled newspaper (Nodohng Shinmuhn) continued its usual anti- American tirades,
calling the U.S. a "nuclear criminal."172 The North Korean newspaper, given the history
of what has transpired thus far, appears more representative of Pyongyang's actual stance.
While speaking against the "inflammatory" language of the U.S., it frequently resorts to
inflammatory anti-American language itself.
Multi-Lateral the Preferred Course
Although there have been multilateral talks in Beijing, they have largely consisted
of recitations of each country's positions, with no real progress towards an agreement.
The United States, North and South Korea, China, Japan and Russia have attempted for
months to set up another (fourth) meeting to pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear
weapons, a development that all the other countries sans North Korea claim to seek. The
Six-Party Talks have thus far failed to make much substantive progress in resolving the
current crisis on the peninsula. For the most part, the delegates from each country have
reiterated their positions and stood their ground. There have been minor agreements as to
170
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the setting up of sub-committees that would address issues: however, no breakthroughs
have yet emerged. North Korea indefinitely suspended the Six Party talks this year (2005)
while giving conditions for it to return to these multilateral talks.
The efforts to encourage North Korea to continue in the multi-lateral talks,
however, is still a favorable one because it takes North Korea’s regional neighbors and
applies international pressure upon North Korea to disarm. However, Russia and China
have thus far taken a less than tenacious stance towards North Korea and its nuclear
weapons. Yet the U.S. has let each country know that applying such pressure to North
Korea would be desirable.173
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, indefinite suspension by North Korea, and the
absence of a breakthrough, this approach is better than the US appearing to engage in
unilateral efforts. Accordingly, the present administration is doing a fine job of resisting
the brinkmanship blackmail that North Korea again attempts to perpetrate. Allowing
North Korea to go straight to the US, over the head of South Korea, seriously undermines
South Korea. If there is any bilateral action, it should first and foremost be between
South Korea and North Korea, who after all live on the same peninsula in question, not
North Korea and the US.
China's role could prove critical in resolving the crisis. As North Korea's best ally
in the world, China's strong insistence that North Korea denuclearize the peninsula would
carry the most weight. Whether China would do so remains in considerable doubt.
Russia, which has recently renewed its ties with North Korea, while not as
influential as China, might have some sway with North Korea. North Korea still owes a
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sizable monetary debt to Russia.174 Russia could offer a measure of debt forgiveness as
an incentive for North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons and program.
Japan has aligned itself with South Korea and the United States. It takes a firm
stance that North Korea must get rid of its nuclear arms.175 Given the outrageous actions
by North Korea in abducting Japanese citizens and the sending of fraudulent bones of one
of them when the issue arose, some 70 percent of the Japanese public support the levying
of sanctions against North Korea.176
A Role for the UN Secretary General
These multi- party talks might benefit from outside assistance. The UN Secretary
General, currently Kofi Anan, could use his office as a mediator for multi-party talks.177
Passive attempts to make the Secretary General office available, as well as attempts to
diminish tensions by going and visiting the respective countries, South and North Korea,
have not helped in the past.178 Yet, when the U.S. failed in its attempts to gain the liberty
of captured airmen, the Secretary General used his office to negotiate the release of
captured U.S. airmen after the Korean War.179 A role as mediator for an existing multiparty framework though, may help drive the talks.
North Korea has stated, however, that it does not consider the U.N. a neutral
party.180 Their argument stems from the UN's condemnation, and subsequent military
action against, the North Korean aggression that started the Korean War. It all too
conveniently does not credit the aid that UN organizations have rendered to North Korea.
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Implementing This Strategy
Hwang Jang Yop also indicated that Kim Jong Il is a coward, and capriciously
changes his decisions based on his mood.181 If that is so, it is possible that a course of
diplomacy that is incrementally increased to the point of actively going in and disarming
North Korea at the last stage of this process might be the best thing--to call North Korea’s
bluff and see whether or not Kim Jong Il proves to be as courageous as Sadam Hussain
was--darting from spider hole to spider hole and offering very little resistance to US
forces notwithstanding his inflated rhetoric.
However, this would not be the first or even most desirable step in the process—it
should come only if prior efforts fail. A call for continued multi-lateral pressure from
other countries and international organizations, with resort as much as possible to
international law, should continue—whether or not North Korea returns to the six-party
talks. Additionally, invitations to North Korea to engage in negotiations either through
the good offices of the UN secretary general and/or to the multi-lateral six-party talks can
be extended to Pyongyang again.
Step by step, the heat can be raised on North Korea, and as the heat is being
raised, the drive for accountable ways (also known as CVID:182 Complete, Verifiable and
Irreversible Dismantlement) in which North Korea could indeed be disarmed can be
pursued. After the heat increases sufficiently, giving some positive incentives for North
Korea to comply could increase the likelihood of a peaceful resolution.183 Both sticks
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and carrots (but sticks first184) of these can be incrementally ratcheted up, step by step,
stage by stage, to the point where if none of these things work, only then would it be time
for a very proactive international effort to disarm North Korea. Such an approach seems
to be the best way to approach the North Korean crisis because softer approaches have
clearly failed repeatedly in the past.
Giving positive incentives and a soft landing or a soft way out after turning up the
heat and pressure might be much more persuasive to a regime that operates on the basis
of fear and intimidation of its own people, as well as its regional neighbors, and indeed,
the world.185 Along the lines of this incremental ratcheting up, it could include possibly
an agreement with specific resort to the UN Security Council and the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) upon noncompliance, and whatever is maximally possible through the
IAEA186 built in.
Along these lines, it could then help to have UN Security Council resolutions187 or
other assertive action.188 The basis for such resolutions and possible sanctions can lie
squarely on the multiple instruments of international law that North Korea has violated.
Consider, for example, that it has broken every single major agreement that they have
made, whether with another country(ies) or international organizations: the biological
weapons convention, the cease-fire agreement after their initial Korean War, the 1991-92
184
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agreements with South Korea, the 2000 agreement after the summit between the leaders
of South Korea and North, the 1994 Agreed Framework, the IAEA dictates, the nonproliferation treaty that it belonged to since 2003, etc. 189 Hwang Jang Yop indicates how
North Korea only enters into such agreements for tactical gain—not with any intention to
restrict itself based on legal instruments.190
There is an interesting secondary role that the General Assembly can play if the
UN Security Council is paralyzed by the abuse of a veto by, for example, China, who
would be the most likely one to veto actions--including resolutions or sanctions against
North Korea.191 It can take the initiative to recommend action by the UN Security
Council in such situations while passing resolutions of its own.192
There should be international, not just U.S. verification of North Korea's
disarmament, and that what they did in terms of kicking out the IAEA inspectors193 in the
past would firmly be deemed to be unacceptable. Otherwise, the acceptability and
impunity of nuclear proliferation would be a message learned by other potentially
dangerous regimes. Ideally, it would be best if North Korea returns to the NPT Treaty—
given that it was the first country in history to withdraw from it and disavow it in 2003.194
Regardless of North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, there remains little doubt that
they breached it while still a party to it.195
Again, it is worth stressing that there ought to be as many defensive measures put
in place by the South Korean and US military to deter North Korean aggression as much
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as possible. The US must reaffirm a strong determination to defend South Korea. What
North Korea would perceive as U.S. weakness or anticipated non-involvement could
prove catastrophic for the peninsula.
In this whole process of external pressure, North Korea could come closer and
closer to an internal collapse,196 in which case the possibility for reunification exists. On
the other hand, the threat of China perhaps stepping in and grabbing North Korea would
then be distinct possibilities.China, however, denies a desire in this direction. 197
There are various factors that have been correlated to increase the likelihood of
success for the course of coercive diplomacy, and each of these can be applied to the
North Korean context.198 Although each context is not identical to other contexts, certain
analogies may be drawn.
Conclusion
A situation as complex199 as the current North Korean crisis requires an
understanding of history200 and context, a consideration of options and ideas from various
angles (including legal), and courageous yet not foolhardy implementation. The stakes
could rise as high as not only another Korean War, but at its worst, even World War III,
if countries such as China, Russia, Japan and the United States all enter the fray.
On the other hand, a successful resolution can build a bridge towards peaceful
reunification, which could help considerably in stabilizing the region, stimulate growth
and cooperation there, and avert a horrendous cataclysm. If the thoughts in this article
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help move the situation towards greater understanding and resolution through
implementation in even a small way, it would have fulfilled its primary raison d'etre. If
it at least gives more clarity to the issues involved so that all concerned may see more
sharply, then it was not written in vain. While at best a work in progress as the actual
situation continues to unfold, it aims to provide constructive insight into a very
precarious, real life situation that cries out to be understood and addressed--rather than
ignored.

